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ARE SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS INHERENTLY
UNEQUAL?
Michael Heise*
SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING.
By Rosemary C. Salomone. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2003.
Pp. xv, 287. $29.95.

INTRODUCTION

In chess, a "fork" occurs when a player, in a single move, attacks
two or more of an opponent's pieces simultaneously, forcing a
necessary choice between unappealing outcomes. Similar to the
potentially devastating chess move, single-sex public schooling forks
many constitutionalists and feminists. Constitutionalists are forced to
reexamine the "separate-but-equal" doctrine's efficacy, this time
through the prism of gender. Although the doctrine - forged in the
crucible of race and overcome in the monumental triumph we know as
Brown v. Board of Education1 - rested dormant for generations,
persistent (and increasing) single-sex education options are forciag
scholars to rethink long-held assumptions about how to breathe new
life into the equal educational opportunity doctrine. To some
constitutionalists "separate" schools threaten to march girls back to
the pre-Brown era and a gendered version of an educational Jim
Crow. To others single-sex schools paradoxically enhance educational
opportunity by affording more girls (or boys)2 the chance to achieve
their full academic potential.
The prospect of single-sex public schooling also forces many
feminists to confront a similarly stark and uncomfortable choice
between theoretical purity and intellectual honesty on the one hand
and the more pragmatic educational needs of young girls -

* Professor, Cornell Law School. A.B., Stanford University; J.D., University of Chicago;
Ph.D., Northwestern University. - Ed. Dawn Chutkow, Dan Cole, James E. Ryan, and
Trevor Morrison provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. Reference librarians at
Cornell Law School, Hayley E. Reynolds, and Amanda Meader provided excellent research
assistance.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Throughout this Review I use conventional education law terminology and refer to
"girls" and "boys" when discussing elementary and secondary students. The terms "women"
and "men" denote post-secondary students.
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particularly low-income and minority girls - on the other. The mere
idea of publicly supported single-sex schools strikes some feminists as
anathema, which reflects an appalling retreat and the gender wars'
unfinished business. Single-sex schools are especially painful for those
women who still carry scars from the days when girls' educational
interests were reflexively subordinated to boys' educational interests.
After protracted and difficult battles and having finally established in
1979 a statutory foothold in Title IX,3 the prospect of "going back" to
state-sponsored de jure "girls-only" schools represents for many
feminists an unfathomable retreat. Consequently, some feminists do
not even blink at the necessity - however regrettable - of sacrificing
the present educational needs of some girls - even girls from low
income households ill-served by failing traditional coeducational
public schools - on the altar of coeducation's theoretical purity. For
these feminists, acknowledging possible differences between girls and
boys and entertaining the prospect of single-sex public schools tailored
to such differences would produce unacceptable political costs. For
those reflexively opposed to single-sex schooling, emerging education
data - however uncomfortable - are simply insufficient to trump
ideological purity and consistency. For other feminists, however,
coeducation's ideological purity and consistency gave way to a
pragmatic assessment of girls' educational needs. These feminists have
concluded that separatism is a small (indeed, perhaps, sometimes
welcome) price for a focused educational program and that single-sex
education can be structured in a manner that neither risks gender
subordination nor perpetuates the "legal, social, or economic
inferiority of women."4
For constitutionalists and feminists the stakes posed by single-sex
schools are high, the implications indelicate and uncomfortable.
Opponents of single-sex schooling "remain transfixed in equality as
sameness" (p. 63). In contrast, proponents "weave through the maze
of sex differences, women's historical subordination, and inequalities
based on race and class while struggling to avoid the deep and
dangerous pitfalls of deficiency, essentialism, and categorical
stereotypes" (p. 63). For those "forked" by the single-sex schooling
issue none of the options looks especially appealing. Professor
Rosemary C. Salomone's book, Same, Different, Equal: Rethinking
Single-Sex Schooling,5 stands unblinking at the intersection where
3. Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 1 1 , 1979) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
pt. 86).
4. Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality: The
Young Women's Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 112
(1998).
5. Professor Salomone is the Kenneth Wang Professor at St. John's University School
of Law.
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these two competing visions collide. Salomone's analyses skillfully
sketch the contours of options that flow from seemingly irreconcilable
visions of gender and education that continue to define public and
scholarly debates about single-sex schooling.
Professor Salomone deserves praise for even approaching such
contentious terrain. That she does so with intellectual rigor, honesty,
and a healthy dose of scholarly discipline and distance warrants even
more praise. What is clear from the book's opening paragraph is that
Professor Salomone possesses a clear understanding of the larger
social context that frequently frames complex legal and policy
questions, such as the one posed by single-sex schooling. Salomone
structures her treatment of single-sex schooling by juxtaposing two
distinct - though, as Salomone notes, related - events that took
place in the summer of 1996. First, the Supreme Court invalidated
Virginia Military Institute's ("VMI") all-male admissions policy;6
weeks later the New York City School Board announced plans to
open the Young Women's Leadership School, a public all-girls middle
school for low-income families in East Harlem (p. 1). Both events
aptly reflect competing visions of single-sex education. But the
Supreme Court's conclusion that the all-male "Rat Line"7 at VMI ran
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment casts a constitutional shadow
over the effort to create an academic safe haven in East Harlem
designed to provide an educational lifeline to low-income (and
overwhelmingly minority) girls. Salomone's suggestion that these two
events may be inextricably intertwined helps to uncover unsettling and
shifting assumptions about gender, sex, race, education, and ideology.
Two questions - one legal, the other policy - moor Professor
Salomone's treatment of single-sex schooling. First, are public single
sex schools constitutional? Second, what educational benefits (for girls
or boys), if any, are attributable to single-sex schooling (pp. 5-6)?
After surveying the relevant theoretical literatures, working through
Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment, and exploring the available
social-science evidence, Professor Salomone's analyses and arguments
support the weight of her unambiguous conclusion: "[I]t defies reason
for government to mandate coeducation for all students enrolled in
public schools" (p. 243).
Regardless of whether one agrees with Professor Salomone's
conclusion, Same, Different, Equal succeeds on many levels. At a
general level, Salomone's treatment of single-sex schooling

6. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
7. By tradition, first-year students at VMI are referred to, informally, as "rats." The
"Rat Line" narrowly refers to VMI first-year cadets standing at attention in formation as
well as more broadly (and loosely) to a first-year cadet's total experience at VMI. See Scott
M. Smiler, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Virginia Military Institute: A Culmination of
Strategic Success, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 541, 560-61 (1998).
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successfully straddles law and policy. This is a considerable
accomplishment as such undertakings traditionally emphasize either
law or policy or unfold in a schizophrenic manner. At a more specific
level, her comprehensive treatment of single-sex schooling advances
our understanding of the increasingly congested intersection of law
and education policy. In so doing, the book achieves the more modest
goals of tracking the equal educational opportunity doctrine's
development and enhancing our understanding of the courts' role in
promoting it. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Brown decision, calls
for greater scholarly and public attention to equal educational
opportunity - such as Salomone's - are particularly apt. In addition,
those seeking to help schoolchildren obtain a better education will
benefit greatly from an increased understanding of how law and policy
interact in this important context. Given the recent increased interest
in single-sex education,8 it is unlikely that those committed to greater
educational equity will be able to ignore how education and gender
intersect. Scholars and policymakers who engage with the single-sex
schooling issue need to take account of Salomone's analyses.
Within the single-sex education literature, Same, Different, Equal
should serve as the reference point for the foreseeable future. This
book is important not only for what it says, but for how it says it. As to
the former, Part I of this Review explores how single-sex schooling
forces constitutionalists and feminists to confront the complicated and
dynamic equal educational opportunity doctrine. How Professor
Salomone develops and structures her thesis is equally important, and
Part II focuses on Salomone's use of social-science evidence to inform
her legal analyses and drive her policy analyses. Perhaps unsettling to
some, Salomone's use of social-scientific evidence - necessary for her
policy arguments - arcs back to the Brown9 opinion and enhances our
evolving understanding about what equal education means.10 Finally,
Part III considers the possible future of single-sex schooling within the
larger context of the evolving educational reform setting.

8. For example, the National Association for Single Sex Public Education reports that in
August 2003, six new single-gender schools opened their doors. See Single-Sex Public
Schools in the United States, at http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.htrnl (last visited
Aug. 12, 2004).
9. 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
10. Compare Michael Heise, Equal Education by the Numbers: The Warren Court's
Empirical Legacy, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309 (2002) (arguing that the equal educational
opportunity doctrine became increasingly empirical post-Brown) [hereinafter Heise, Equal
Education by the Numbers], with James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science
Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003) (arguing that the
equal educational opportunity doctrine did not become increasingly empirical in post-Brown
desegregation cases) [hereinafter Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence].
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UNCOMFORTABLE FORKS

A. Constitutionalists
The Brown decision and its proclamation that "separate is
inherently unequal" rightly animate constitutionalists. Brown also
fuels opposition to single-sex schooling, shapes its legal analysis, and
profoundly informs educational policy across the country. Although
Brown has not been interpreted to preclude single-sex schooling
options, the decision contributes to "a roller-coaster ride of aborted
starts and veiled attempts" (p. 117). Single-sex schooling directly
confronts Brown's core tenant. The long shadow cast by Brown makes
many recoil from contemplating anything remotely resembling
separate but equal. Insofar as Brown is one of the most important
legal decisions of the twentieth century,11 inevitable discomfort flows
from reopening discussions of whether "separate" can indeed be
"equal" in a manner that comports with Brown's dictates.12
Although the application of Brown's logic to single-sex schooling
- the potential constitutional transitivity of race and gender possesses obvious and intuitive appeal, Salomone devotes
considerable effort to illustrating how the analogy itself is limited (p.
119). Antidiscrimination and antisubordination principles make
Brown relevant to the single-sex schooling issue, and both principles
resonate deeply with women's past treatment in the education arena.
To assess competently the constitutional efficacy of today's single-sex
schools, however, Salomone urges that we "disengage" from past
indignities and come to terms with both the subtle nuances and the
sharp distinctions between then and now (p. 119). Although ever
11. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF
3, 8, 12 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).

EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID

12. To be sure, Salomone is not the first to take up the constitutional question raised by
public single-sex schooling. Indeed, the VMI decision spurred a growing discussion in the
literature. See generally Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public Single-Sex Education, 1 8
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227 ( 1994-1995) (advocating for single-sex education); William
Henry Hurd, Gone With the Wind?, VM/'s Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Education, 4
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 27 (1997) (arguing for greater constitutional accommodation
of single-sex schools); Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis after United States v.
Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 381, 384 ( 1999) (identifying the circumstances that might help single-sex schools
survive constitutional scrutiny); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Public Education A fter VMI:
The Case for Women's Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1998) (arguing for greater
constitutional accommodation of single-sex schools); Carolyn B. Ramsey, Subtracting Sexism
from the Classroom: Law and Policy in the Debate Over A ll-Female Math and Science
Classes in Public Schools, 8 TEXAS J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1998) (arguing that all-girl math and
science classes do not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Valorie K. Vojdik,
Girls' Schools After VMI: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 69
(1997) (arguing that all-girls schools are unconstitutional); Verna L. Williams, Reform or
Retrenchment: Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and Gender, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 15 (2004) (arguing that single-sex schooling is unconstitutional in part due to its
intersection with race).
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mindful of the past, Salomone asks readers to look forward where,
according to Salomone, the constitutional view differs.
Salomone distinguishes between past and present single-sex
schooling. In the current context, attendance in single-sex schools is
voluntary, and coeducational options remain, if not predominate.
Salomone also outlines "fundamental differences" between race
and sex and correctly notes that the Court recognizes such differences
by imposing a less onerous standard of judicial review upon sex-based
classifications (pp. 120-21). Finally, and most importantly, Salomone
inverts the Brown-based constitutional critique of single-sex schooling
by arguing that the current push for single-sex schools (unlike many
past campaigns) endeavors to fulfill - indeed, perhaps, to enhance the promise for equal educational opportunity articulated in Brown
(p. 120). To be sure, the argument that Brown can be honored by
"separate but equal" is a complicated and deep constitutional paradox
fraught with peril. But notwithstanding the peril, in a dramatic twist
loaded with irony, Salomone urges that in the education context, as it
relates to gender, separate can be inherently equal. It is difficult to
overemphasize the complexity and force of this rhetorical inversion.
Her case studies describing the legal fights over single-sex schooling in
Philadelphia and Detroit make these difficulties painfully clear
(Chapter Six). In the end, Professor Salomone, as mindful as anyone
of the associated risks, is prepared to depart from the past, look anew,
and embrace such a paradox. Opponents of single-sex schooling will
not or can not do the same.13
B.

Feminists

If constitutionalists find the single-sex schooling issue
uncomfortable, many feminists find it downright painful. Feminists
coalesced around the legal assault against the previously all-male
publicly-funded Virginia Military Institute. The multiyear effort
consumed substantial time, effort, resources, and energy. In the main,
these feminists managed to maintain a strong facade of repulsion
against the single-sex admissions policy. Their effort culminated in
June 1996 when the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
Ginsburg, one of feminisms' "own,"14 struck down VMl's single-sex
admissions policy as contrary to constitutional requirements.15 The
Court's sweeping United States v. Virginia ( "VMI" ) decision endures
13. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Carol Pressman, The House That Ruth Built: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Gender and Justice, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 311, 314-15 (1997-1998) (discussing Justice
Ginsburg's crusade against gender discrimination, especially in her capacity as co-director of
the ACLU Women's Rights Project).
15. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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as a rallying cry for feminists and the quest for gender equity in
education.
Several weeks later, the loud, public feminist rallying cry turned to
audible gasps and groans as the nation's media turned its attention to
a decision by the New York public school district to launch a public
all-girls middle school for inner-city minority students.16 Almost
instantly, parents in East Harlem busily prepared their daughters for
an opportunity at an educationally liberating environment - one
previously preserved for those wealthy enough to afford private school
tuition. At the same time, some feminists, fresh from their passionate
and successful assault against VMI's all-male policies, regrouped to
support a single-sex school designed to help girls. In contrast, many
feminist organizations as well as organizations sympathetic to
mainstream feminist positions (including the National Organization
for Women and the American Civil Liberties Union) condemned all
girls schools just as ferociously as they opposed all-boys schools. The
feminist coalition, publicly united in its successful campaign to
extinguish VMI's all-male heritage, began to implode when
confronted with an education initiative seeking to serve traditionally
underserved minority girls. Feminists suddenly realized that if their
fight against VMI resembled the "Great War," their subsequent fight
against East Harlem's all-girls school resembled Vietnam.
The traditional feminist and liberal coalitions split from the start.
Long-assumed lines frayed; alliances dissolved. Leading progressive
icons rebuked what they perceived to be a reflexive assault on single
sex education. Those who for decades fought side-by-side on behalf of
sex equality now face off against one another in legal and policy
squabbles (p. 39). Professor Derrick Bell - whose liberal credentials
remain above reproach - symbolizes this dissonance. In a widely
noted essay published on the opinion page of the New York Times,
Professor Bell chided the ACLU for their "war against [the] girls'
school in Harlem."17 With his especially acute sense of constitutional
history in general and the equal educational opportunity doctrine in
particular, Professor Bell's impression that the NOW and the ACLU's
interpretation of constitutional requirements ran directly against the
needs of poor minority children gained particular attention. Bell also
invoked the haunting mixed legacy of the school desegregation effort
by noting that even successful lawsuits with the best of intentions can
sometimes "do no more than maint.ain a woeful status quo."18

16. See Sarah Kershaw, Feds Set to Approve All-Girl Academy, NEWSDAY, Feb. 12,
1998, at A29.
17. Derrick Bell, Et Tu, A.CL. U.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at A23.
18. Id. Professor Bell's complex and nuanced views on race in general and school
desegregation in particular resist facile description. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE
NOT SAVED : THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 108-09 (1987) (considering
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Critical changes in single-sex schooling are one source of the
fracture in the traditional feminist movement.19 Where single-sex
schooling in the past typically worked to the disadvantage of girls and
women, some single-sex schooling options now stand to benefit them.
Thus, as Salomone correctly points out, feminists' historic posture has
been turned "inside out" (p. 150). Traditionally - and h.istorically women and girls were on the outside seeking entry into educational
institutions. Consequently, admission into schools previously reserved
for men and boys was correctly viewed as an integral part of securing
broader equality of opportunity. Indeed, many viewed full equal
access to education as an essential element of women's equality. The
ultimately successful VMI litigation, and the end of that school's long
history of exclusively male privilege, provided a visceral bridge to
women's past efforts at securing equal rights and educational
opportunity.
If VMI aptly symbolized women's educational suffrage of the past,
the Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem symbolizes its
future. The Young Women's Leadership School embodies an
emerging perspective shared by a growing number of feminists,
especially second- and third-generation feminists. The disputes about
VMI and the Young Women's Leadership School force us to consider
whether the formal equity of coeducation advances or, paradoxically,
limits women's quest for realizing greater equality in education (p. 53).
Salomone and other single-sex school supporters share a conviction
that single-sex education - especially for girls and low-income
families - is now essential as a remedy for unequal education.
C.

The Peculiar (and Evolving) Role of Justice Ginsburg

Justice Ginsburg's important and unique role in shaping the legal
framework for sex discrimination informs single-gender education as
well as straddles an emerging generational "divide" that is beginning
to distinguish emerging feminists from their foremothers. Indeed,
Justice Ginsburg's personal history supplies essential context. Given
Justice Ginsburg's biography, it is difficult to imagine a person better
alternative motives for the Brown decision); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF
THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 104 (1992) (discussing possible unintended
consequences of the Brown decision).
19. Numerous other factors contributed to the splintering of the traditional feminist
coalition on the issue of single-sex schooling. Regrettably, Professor Salomone does not
delve into other factors with the same rigor as she devotes to single-sex schooling. To be fair,
although single-sex schooling and feminist theory inevitably intersect, Professor Salomone
sought to analyze the former and not the latter, formally anyway. It would strike me as
unfair to criticize a book for what it did not undertake as opposed to dwelling on what it did
undertake. For those interested in pursuing a more detailed analysis of intrafeminist fighting,
see, for example, NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 153-67
(1998).
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positioned to embody the rich complexity that characterizes the single
sex schooling issue. And to the extent that the warring factions within
the feminist community share any common ground - and this is a big
if - the broad intellectual terrain marked by Justice Ginsburg's vision
might define it.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg graduated at the top of her high school class
and with high honors from Cornell University. Two years after
graduating from Cornell she entered Harvard Law School. After her
second year (and earning an offer to join the Harvard Law Review)
she transferred to Columbia Law School incident to her husband
accepting a position with a New York City law firm. Ginsburg
petitioned Harvard Law School for a law degree pending the
successful completion of her third year of legal studies at Columbia.
However, although law schools routinely permit students to undertake
their final year of law school at a "commensurate" or "peer"
institution and receive a diploma from the law school where they
began and completed two of the required three years course of study,
Harvard Law School declined to extend Ginsburg such a courtesy.20
Consequently, she completed her legal training at and received her
law school diploma from Columbia.21
Following law school graduation, Ginsburg served as a law clerk to
District Court Judge Edmund Palmieri. In 1963 Ginsburg began
teaching at Rutgers Law School and launched a successful academic
career. During her stint at Rutgers, then-professor Ginsburg became
involved with the ACLU New Jersey affiliate. Soon thereafter she
founded and codirected the ACLU Women's Rights Project. In 1972,
Ginsburg departed Rutgers and returned to Columbia as the first
female tenured member of its law faculty. She joined the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1980 and, in 1993, was
elevated to the United States Supreme Court.
During the 1970s Ginsburg quickly earned a reputation as one of
the nation's leading women's rights litigators. She argued numerous

20. See Gerald Gunther, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Personal, Very Fond Tribute, 20 U.
HAW. L. REV. 583, 583 (1998) (noting that Harvard Law School denied Ginsburg's petition
even though similar petitions by men were "quite frequently granted"); see also Herma H.
Kay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2, 9 (2004) (same).

21. At Columbia Law School, Ginsburg shared the top graduating spot with one other
student. This vignette did not end with her graduation from Columbia, however. Years later
Harvard Law School, (correctly) sensing a lapse in its institutional judgment by previously
declining to permit Justice Ginsburg the honor of joining its roll of alumnae, endeavored to
"fix" the situation in 1972 when it invited Justice Ginsburg to exercise the option of
receiving a formal Harvard Law School degree. By that time Justice Ginsburg was well into
her academic career and work litigating gender discrimination claims with the ACLU and, in
particular, its Women's Rights Law Project. Justice Ginsburg declined Harvard Law
School's invitation and remains a full alumna of the Columbia Law School. For a full
discussion, see ELEANOR H. AYER, RUTH BADER GINSBURG: FIRE AND STEEL ON THE
SUPREME COURT 31 (1994).
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path-breaking cases venturing into new terrain, carved new law in the
civil rights area, and litigated many of the era's leading gender
discrimination cases.22 Notable was Ginsburg's work on the
Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia23 case.
In Vorchheimer, a girl was denied admission to Philadelphia's
prestigious Central High School for Boys solely on the basis of her
gender. The applicant, Susan Vorchheimer, confronted the argument
that her access to either coeducational schools or the Philadelphia
High School for Girls satisfied the school district's statutory and
constitutional requirements. Simply put, Philadelphia advanced a
"separate-but-equal" theory. Although the academically able
applicant prevailed at the district court level, an underdeveloped
("paltry," according to Salomone) trial record hamstrung her case at
the court of appeals (p. 1 23). The Third Circuit concluded that the
plaintiff's access to a public single-sex option, though not the precise
single-sex option that the plaintiff preferred, conferred an "equal
benefit and not discriminatory denial. "24
As the Vorchheimer case progressed to the Supreme Court, the
ACLU's Ruth Bader Ginsburg took the lead in crafting the certiorari
petition. The petition advanced the strong form of the Brown
doctrine: in the education context, separate is inherently unequal for
gender, just as it is for race (p. 123). In reaching that conclusion, the
ACLU petition drew extensively from sociological work by Professors
Jencks and Riesman. In their work on all-male colleges, Professors
Jencks and Riesman noted that it would be easier to defend all-male
colleges had they emerged from a society where women were co
equals with men. But, in the context of a male-dominant society, the
researchers concluded that all-male colleges implicitly or explicitly
reinforce assumptions about male superiority - "assumptions for
which women must eventually pay" (p. 123).
Twenty years later, in V MI, Justice Ginsburg again had occasion to
engage with and reshape the legal analysis of single-sex education.
Factual similarities linked the two cases. Similar to Philadelphia's
Central High School for Boys, VMl's all-male admissions posture was
a relic of a past era when society considered women unfit for higher
22. During the 1970s Justice Ginsburg argued seven cases in front of the Supreme
Court, losing only one. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Edwards v. Healy, 421 U.S. 772 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (lost); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
23. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (No. 75-2005), affd
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
24. P. 122; see Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887-88. Indeed, the Philadelphia High School
for Girls, established in 1848, enrolls almost 1 ,500 girls and is the largest single-sex public
school in the United States.
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education as well as military service. Eerily parallel to Philadelphia's
Girl's High, VMI, in light of mounting legal pressure, invested
considerable resources for the development of a "separate-but-equal"
program for women, located at nearby Mary Baldwin College. What
became manifestly clear during trial, however, was that the separate
program at Mary Baldwin College "scarcely" resembled what VMI
offered to its male students and, therefore, was hardly equal (p. 157).
Despite similar cases, Justice Ginsburg advanced a slightly
different position on single-sex education. In contrast to the "separate
is inherently unequal" position Ginsburg advanced as a litigant on
behalf of her client in Vorchheimer, the position she crafted in her
capacity as an Associate Justice for the Court in VMI does not
expressly preclude gender separatism in education. The formal test
articulated in VMI imposes upon state uses of gender classification
"skeptical" judicial scrutiny. Specifically, gender classifications must
be "substantially related" to an "important" governmental interest
and supported by an "exceedingly persuasive justification. "25 Of
particular import is that any sex classification not rest upon "fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."26
The onus upon state sex classifications in the education setting is
quite severe (just how severe remains to be seen), and Justice
Ginsburg's VMI opinion contributes to the severity. That said, the
legal analysis in the VMI decision conveys a desire to cautiously
navigate constitutional doctrine between competing visions of sex
equality or equal treatment. Unlike race, the Court in VMI declared
that "the inherent differences between men and women" are "cause
for celebration," but not for the denial of equal opportunity.27 Unlike
her position two decades earlier in Vorchheimer, in VMI Justice
Ginsburg appears intellectually open to the possibility that a public
single-sex school can pass constitutional muster. Indeed, conspicuously
absent from the Court's VMI opinion is any reference to Brown. The
analytical trick, as Professor Cass Sunstein notes, is to prevent
instances where different treatment transforms gender differences into
disadvantages.28
That Justice Ginsburg wrote the Court's opinion in VMI teems
with irony. Indeed, neither the history nor irony of the moment were
lost on Justice Ginsburg as she remarked that the decision was like
"winning the Vorchheimer case twenty years later" (p. 165). Then
Georgetown Law School Dean Mark Tushnet noted that, for Justice

25. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524, 531 (1996).
26. Id. at 541 (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982)) .
27. Virginia, 518 U.S. a t 533-34 (internal quotations omitted).
28. CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 165 (1999).
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Ginsburg, the VMI decision was one she had hoped the Court would
one day arrive at when she began generating the legal precedent
decades earlier (p. 165).
Irony aside, what accounts for Justice Ginsburg's almost
Solomonic desire to strike down VMl's all-male policies yet preserve
the constitutional possibility of single-sex schooling? Moreover, what
explains Justice Ginsburg's varying views about the constitutionality
of single-sex public schooling? The variation - however slight disgruntled some of Justice Ginsburg's feminist allies.29 First, the
decidedly different roles that Justice Ginsburg played in the
Vorchheimer and VMI litigation possess important explanatory value.
In her capacity as an attorney zealously representing her client's legal
interests in Vorchheimer, Justice Ginsburg's position that separate is
inherently unequal makes obvious sense. In contrast, Justice
Ginsburg's role in VMI, an Associate Justice seeking to craft an
opinion that garnered as many votes as possible, might help explain
her unwillingness to preclude the constitutional possibility of single
sex schooling.
Second, Justice Ginsburg's personal history provides additional
clues. On the one hand, it is hardly surprising that Justice Ginsburg
would side with the Court's majority and conclude that VMl's male
only admissions policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Having
confronted - and overcome - significant gender-related barriers
throughout her professional life, Justice Ginsburg was especially well
positioned to understand the plight of women pushing past gender
stereotypes to achieve full equality and justice.
Other aspects of Justice Ginsburg's personal history might explain
why she did not stake out a stronger position - one articulated in
Brown and echoed in Vorchheimer - concluding that separate is
inherently unequal, as some feminists would urge.30 Although Justice
Ginsburg is surely conscious of women's struggles with discrimination,
she is also mindful of some of the benefits that single-sex education
can provide. This is especially true as Justice Ginsburg educated her
daughter at The Brearley School, an exclusive, private all-girls school
in Manhattan.31 Therefore, it is perhaps less than surprising to find in
the VMI opinion - albeit in dicta - support for the position,
advanced by a group of women's colleges in an amicus brief, that the

29. See, e.g., Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism,
and VMI, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 97, 146 (2000-2001) (noting that some scholars question
whether Justice Ginsburg maximized her opportunity to advance gender equality through
the VMI opinion).
30. See LEVIT, supra note 19, at 86.
31. Justice Ginsburg's daughter graduated from The Brearley School in 1973.
Obviously, as a technical matter, The Brearley School's status as a private school
distinguishes it from the publicly funded schools at issue in Vorchheimer and VMI.
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Constitution has no quarrel with single-sex schools that "dissipate,
rather than perpetuate, traditional gender classifications."32
Third, it remains at least plausible that Justice Ginsburg has always
been sympathetic to some forms of public single-sex education, for the
reasons advanced by Salomone. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's position
may have evolved over time, just as women's status has evolved. From
Justice Ginsburg's vantage point, perhaps the women's movement
progressed enough during the twenty years between Vorchheimer and
VMI that the threat posed by public single-sex schooling has
diminished to the point where public single-sex schools like the Young
Women's Leadership School in Harlem are positioned to advance
rather than ossify gender stereotypes. If so, it is possible to reconcile
her legal positions articulated in Vorchheimer and VMI and her
support for private and presumed support for some forms of public
single-sex schools.
II.

IS COED COEQUAL? THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Along with what Professor Salomone thinks about single-sex
schooling, how she crafts her argument matters. Professor Salomone
treats the single-sex schooling question on both normative and
empirical grounds. With respect to the latter, she carefully and even
handedly summarizes the present social-scientific research base
(Chapter Eight). Professor Salomone is confident enough to point out
where, as is frequently the case, the data are largely indeterminative.
A. Empirical Ambiguity
The empirical ambiguity on the question of determinants of
student educational achievement in single-sex settings is unsurprising,
certainly to those familiar with the relevant social science. Some of the
ambiguity rests on the limitations of existing data. The data limits flow
from two main sources. First, the underlying dependent variables of
interest - student achievement in general and achievement variations
between boys and girls in particular - are especially complex and
difficult to measure. Efforts to measure student academic achievement
have attracted significant and sustained attention from social
scientists. Precisely what causes some students to perform well and
others less well is endlessly debated in the literature. Amid this
persistent debate, a few points of loose agreement have emerged. For
example, most scholars agree that a student's socioeconomic status, as
well as the socioeconomic status of the student's peers, influence

32. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7.
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student academic achievement.33 Although there is also some
agreement that good teachers, strong principals, small schools and
class sizes, and parental involvement can enhance student
achievement, the specific significance of these variables remains the
subject of debate.34 Overlaid onto these specific areas of scholarly
contest is the more general dispute of whether - and, if so, how gender might influence student achievement.
A second distinct, though related, structural limitation relates to
research design. Ideally, social-scientific protocol strives for double
blind, random assignment of subjects into treatment and control
groups.35 Such a standard is comparatively easier to achieve when the
"subjects" are, say, chemicals and the experiments take place in a
controlled laboratory setting. Education research, however, typically
takes place outside of the confines of a sterile, dust-free laboratory
and involves real people, not chemicals. A properly designed double
blind study would result in exposing some students to inferior
educational methods - even if, at the outset, researchers did not
know which methods were inferior. Thus, most institutional review
boards understandably frown upon proposed education research
studies that seek to use traditional scientific methodological protocols.
As a consequence, most education research is limited by virtue of
drawing upon something less than the "gold standard" in terms of
research design and methodology.
Although Professor Salomone correctly emphasizes the limitations
of existing data and difficulties in research designs seeking to generate
useful data, several nuggets of clarity emerge. And while flashes of
clarity can contribute to important insights, what to make of or do
about the insights is not always clear. The following example
explicates.
For years policymakers tried to make sense of two disparate yet
related threads of evidence relating to girls' and boys' test results. On
the one hand, despite some variation between math and verbal scores,
on average girls' overall mean test scores exceed those of boys. To be

33. Professor James Coleman was the first to report this phenomenon in his influential
1966 study for the (then) Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which has since
become known simply as the Coleman Report. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY 301-04 (1966). Scores of subsequent studies have confirmed Coleman's
conclusion. For citations to the literature, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER
Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 25-28
(2001).
34. For a further discussion of research on this point, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 33,
at 86-90.
35. See Jay P. Greene, The Surprising Consensus on School Choice, 144 PUB. INT. 19, 19
(2001) (describing the aspirational "gold standard" research design for school choice
studies).
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more precise, the girls' advantage in verbal skills "substantially
outstrips" the boys' advantage in math (p. 80). On the other hand,
boys are far more likely than girls to achieve extraordinarily high test
scores and boys outperform girls on most Advanced Placement tests.
This anomaly fuels confusion about whether girls or boys (or, for that
matter, both) are being "shortchanged" academically.
Professor Salomone's discussion of recent empirical research on
this puzzle in "Myths and Realities in the Gender Wars" {Chapter
Four) uncovers a powerful explanation that will make sense to anyone
with a passing familiarity of elementary statistics. Simply put, the key
to unlocking the puzzle surrounding boys' and girls' achievement
levels is to understand that the shapes of their distributions vary.
Specifically, the distribution of boys' test scores display greater
variability than girls' test scores (p. 80). Thus, if one envisions how the
two differently shaped distribution curves overlap {the boys'
achievement curve distributes flatter and wider; the girls' curve is
taller and thinner), the seemingly puzzling outcome - girls possessing
a higher overall mean while more boys end up at the upper (and
lower) tail of the bell curve - makes sense. Why boys' and girls'
distribution curves vary and, as a normative matter, what policy ought
to do about it, if anything, although worthy questions, fall outside the
scope of Salomone's book. Identifying and discussing such differences,
however, and understanding what they might mean for single-sex
schooling are central tasks that Salomone aptly undertakes. In the
education context, where comparatively little is known to any degree
of certainty, even small advances can yield important insights and
gains. Indeed, even learning more about what might not be happening
to girls and boys can add scholarly value.
Another point of social-scientific clarity involves the generally
accepted assertion that children attending schools with high
concentrations of low-income students rarely perform as well
academically as their middle-class counterparts.36 Tending to obscure
this larger point are persistent (and growing) squabbles about who is
"winning" and "losing" in the academic race between the sexes (p.
114). Sex-specific student achievement differences defy simple
answers. As well, any such sex differences in academic performance
cut in different directions on a wide range of indicators and continue
to evolve over time.37 Without denigrating the legitimacy and import
of disputes about sex-specific student achievement differences,
Salomone points out such disputes "pale in comparison" to the
escalating academic catastrophe that presently envelopes far too many
students from low-income households and neighborhoods (p. 114).

36. See sources cited supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
37. See sources cited infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
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Notably not clear in the social-scientific literature, however, is
whether single-sex schooling generates benefits and, if so, who reaps
those benefits.
B.

Social Science's Role in Legal Analysis

While Professor Salomone ably synthesizes the social-science
evidence relating to single-sex schooling and Title IX and the
Constitution, she also backs into a larger question: Namely, what is the
proper role for social-science evidence in legal analysis? Such a
question is neither new nor unimportant. Indeed, the current rise in
the production of empirical legal research only enhances the
question's timeliness. Its intellectual pedigree arcs back in time
directly to another education law case, Brown v. Board of Education.38
I have argued elsewhere that the Court's use of social-science
evidence in the Brown decision - whether integral to the outcome or
not - led to an increased empiricization of the judicial understanding
of equal educational opportunity generally.39 Professor Salomone's
treatment of the social-science evidence in the single-sex schooling
context is consistent with my thesis. More importantly, Professor
Salomone's book on single-sex schooling contributes to the emerging
literature that contemplates new models of educational services'
production and delivery.40 Of small regret is that Professor Salomone
does not engage more directly with the largely normative question
about whether and, if so, what type of role social-science evidence
should play in the single-sex schooling debate.41 Of course, the very
structure of Salomone's analysis prominently features relevant social
science evidence, implicitly suggesting that Salomone perceives a role
for empirical research in the related legal and statutory analyses.
Salomone hopes to make legal scholars more sensitive to relevant
social-science evidence. After all, the VMI decision makes clear that
public schools seeking single-sex experiences need to articulate and
defend an "exceedingly persuasive justification"42 to depart from the
default constitutional presumption of coeducation. Such a legal

38. 347 U.S. 383, 494 n.11 (1954). To be sure, courts' use of social-science evidence pre
dates Brown. For a discussion, see generally PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972).
39. See Heise, Equal Education by the Numbers, supra note 10, at 1310. But see Ryan,
The Limited Influence ofSocial Science Evidence, supra note 10 (arguing that social science
evidence has not overly influenced school desegregation litigation).
40. Existing research considers the equal educational opportunity question from such
perspectives as school finance and choice. Emerging work in this genre evidences increased
empirical sophistication.
41. Then again, such a topic warrants a full-length book treatment on its own.
42. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 ( 1996).
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standard essentially begs for empirical confirmation of single-sex
education's asserted benefits. Empirical uncertainty hamstrings the
single-sex school context, however, and Salomone acknowledges as
much (p. 235). Amid this general ambiguity, Salomone cautiously
advances three "reasonable and useful conclusions" (p. 235). First,
schoolchildren are not harmed by single-sex schooling, especially as it
would be volitional in any context contemplated by Salomone.
Second, single-sex schooling fosters more positive student attitudes in
a wider range of academic subjects. Third, where these benefits arise
they disproportionately accrue to minority students. The private
school market supplies another source of indirect evidence.
Presumably tuition-paying families have concluded that private single
sex schools generate real (or perceived) educational value.
Having carved out a role for social-science evidence in legal
analysis, the absence of definitive social-scientific answers (as opposed
to "reasonable and useful conclusions") to key questions in the single
sex-schooling context creates additional legal questions. One such
question is which side of the debate should benefit from the residual
uncertainty. Salomone implicitly grabs for the benefit of the doubt and
implies that in the absence of any clear harms single-sex schooling
experiments should be legally accommodated (p. 235). Moreover, it
would be logically uncomfortable to preclude such experimentation experimentation necessary to generate the sought-after data - solely
on the grounds that insufficient data exist. The benefit of the social
scientific doubt could just as easily go the other direction, however,
especially on matters as contentious as gender equity in education.
More specifically, how a rebuttable presumption is loaded - how
severe and in which direction - could prove enormously important,
perhaps dispositive. Indeed, the social-scientific uncertainty all but
ensures that the position assigned to the wrong side of the rebuttable
presumption will lose. Thus, if single-sex schooling must affirmatively
shoulder the evidentiary burden of establishing that equal educational
opportunity is enhanced before single-sex schools are deemed
constitutional, the evidentiary uncertainty likely precludes single-sex
schools from surviving "skeptical scrutiny."43 In contrast, if opponents
must demonstrate that single-sex schools degrade educational equity,
single-sex schools will prevail. Regrettably, Salomone does not discuss
the implications of the various ways courts might structure the
placement of the evidentiary burden as fully as the topic warrants.

43. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530.
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III. THE FUTURE OF SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING
Professor Salomone notes "growing popular support for single-sex
schooling" despite an "overwhelming cultural preference for
coeducation" (p. 237). As a consequence of enduring legal and social
presumptions, proposals for single-sex schooling begin in a defensive
posture. This is so even where too many traditional educational
schools fail utterly in their duty to provide educational services. Such
failures are more common in schools that serve low-income
schoolchildren.44 The future of single-sex education will unfold within
a larger context that evidences an enduring quest for greater
educational opportunity. As well, factors internal and external to
single-sex schooling will continue to shape its future.
Equal Educational Opportunity Doctrine in Context: From Race,
to Resources, and to Gender

A

The evolution of American education's "Holy Grail" - the equal
educational opportunity doctrine - persists. It is a dynamic doctrine
that has changed profoundly in the past decades. During these years, a
focus on resources has displaced an initial focus on race as the equal
educational opportunity doctrine's principal mooring.45 Though
perhaps not by design, Equal, Same, Different makes a strong (albeit
implicit) case that gender warrants a rightful place at the equal
educational opportunity doctrine table.
In Brown, a unanimous Supreme Court with nothing less than
powerful elegance described providing education as a state and local
government's most important function.46 Since then courts have
consistently echoed a similar theme. Almost twenty years after Brown,
the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez47
44. For a summary of data on educational outcomes, especially in schools that serve
low-income and minority students, see James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political
Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2102-08 (2002).
45. For a fuller account of this point see Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational
Opportunity: School Reform, Law, and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1134-35
(2001).
46.
Compulsory school

attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both

demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 383, 493 (1954).
47. 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
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reaffirmed its "historic dedication to public education,"48 noting that
" 'the grave significance of education both to the individual and to our
society' cannot be doubted."49 Such sentiments are consistent with the
Court's perception of widely shared public values: "American people
have always regarded education and its acquisition of knowledge
as matters of supreme importance."50 Indeed, the Court's recognition
of such values emerges in many Court opinions, even some that
predate Brown.51
That said, a general judicial commitment to the equal educational
opportunity project in earnest does not itself identify an organizing
principle or unifying theme. Since the mid-twentieth century's civil
rights movement, race provided the organizing principle. After Brown,
many legal and policy discussions about equal educational opportunity
have been shaped by the lens of race and expressed through school
desegregation litigation.52 Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to
overstate Brown's impact on our nation's schools,53 conventional
wisdom today suggests that the importance of race in debates over
educational reform is waning.54 The generation-long struggle either
assigned to or assumed by the courts over what equal educational

48. Id. at 30.
49. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (1971)).
50. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
51. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 ( 1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213 (1972) (majority opinion authored by Burger, C.J.), 237, 238-39 (White, J., concurring);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963) (Brennan, J.); McCullum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400. However, it remains important to note that although the
Court has repeatedly recognized education's key role in our society, the right to education
has not been deemed fundamental by the Court for Equal Protection Clause purposes. See,
e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30. But see id. at 98-110 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52. The literature on equal educational opportunity and school desegregation, already
considerable, continues to grow. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); COLEMAN, supra note 33;
LINO A. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND THE SCHOOLS (1976); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCA TION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975);
GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus?: SEGREGATED SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY (1978);
Paul Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983). The fortieth anniversary of
Brown gave rise to another round of scholarly attention. For special symposia law review
issues, see, for example, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. (1995); 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. (1995).
53. For example, Professor Salomone characterizes the Brown decision as
"cataclysmic." See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 3 (1986);
cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
54. To be fair, important exceptions endure. For example, Professor Gary Orfield's
work in the educational opportunity area retains a focus on race as well as, to a growing
degree, ethnicity. See, e.g., http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/aboutus/bios/orfield.
php (last accessed July 30, 2004) (recounting Orfield's major works).
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opportunity means in terms of race has broadened to include other
concerns and alternative organizing principles.
During the past few decades, an emerging focus on resources and
educational quality - as reflected by student and school achievement
- has eclipsed the equal educational opportunity doctrine's prior
focus on race. Two related though distinct factors help explain the
equal educational opportunity doctrine's broadening to encompass
more than race. One factor is the emergence of school finance
litigation which began in earnest when many civil rights activists were
growing increasingly frustrated with the slow and uneven pace of
school desegregation efforts. Interestingly, like their school
desegregation predecessors, school-finance activists advanced a tying
strategy designed to enhance equal education. Whereas school
desegregation activists would tie the fate of white and black students
together by placing them in the same schools, school-finance activists
sought to tie the fate of poor and wealthy public schools by striving for
equal access to educational resources.55 Prior to 1989, litigants
challenging school funding programs primarily sought greater
equalization in per-pupil spending.56 Since 1989, however, adequacy
based theories have displaced equity theories. Presently, most school
finance litigants argue not that all students are entitled to equalized
per-pupil spending, but rather, that all students deserve the funds
necessary to support an adequate education.57 Not surprisingly,
perhaps, the legal pursuit of educational opportunity by seeking to
extract additional resources for schools from school-finance adequacy
litigation is strikingly similar in form and structure to the earlier
struggles over educational equity forged in terms of race.58
A second factor is that a shift in the education reform movement
broadened the equal educational opportunity doctrine's focus to
include educational excellence and quality. Since the mid-1980s equal
educational opportunity has increasingly been construed in terms of
outputs (e.g., student and school academic achievement) rather than
the traditional inputs (e.g., racial composition of schools and per-pupil
spending). Much of the current shift is traceable to the 1983
publication of the report, A Nation A t Risk: The Imperative For
55. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2059 & n.67.
56. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 121-40 (1995); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School
Finance Litigation, and the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1 151,
1 152-53 (1995).
57. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 268-69 ( 1999)
(describing the shift in school finance litigation theory).
58. See generally Michael Heise, The Courts vs. Educational Standards, 120 PUB. INT. 55
(1995) (arguing that the legal construction of equal educational opportunity is in transition).
For a helpful account of the shift in litigation focus from race to wealth for many civil rights
organizations, see, for example, Enrich, supra note 56, at 122-28.
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Educational Reform. 59 The report did not mince words when it came
to describing the scope of the problem confronting American
education: "[T]he educational foundations of our society are presently
being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very
future as a Nation and a people."60 The report immediately broadened
subsequent education-policy reform initiatives' focus to include such
issues as student and school accountability for increased academic
success. In response, many states began the arduous process of
launching efforts to articulate educational standards for their students
and schools as well as assessment mechanisms designed to assess
progress toward the articulated standards.61 As well, recent federal
school reform activity evidences a similar shift. In 1994 President
Clinton signed into law the "Goals 2000: Educate America Act,"62
and, more recently, President Bush signed into law the "No Child Left
Behind Act."63 Although some praise and others criticize these new
federal forays into educational policymaking terrain, few dispute that
they reflect a decidedly new and different posture for the federal
government. 64

B.

The Increasing Relevance of Gender for Equal Educational
Opportunity

The reorientation of the equal educational opportunity doctrine's
focus from inputs to outputs helped generate renewed attention to
gender. The emerging transformation of gender's role within equal
educational opportunity doctrine's evolution follows a well
established path forged by both school desegregation and finance
litigation and theory. Indeed, Salomone's insertion of gender into the
equal educational opportunity mix due to the purported academic
benefits from single-sex schooling both comports with and fuels a

59. See NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK: THE
IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983) (hereinafter NATION AT RISK).
60. Id. at 5.
61. For a brief description of two states' efforts, see Michael Heise, The Courts,
Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 633
(2002) (describing New York and North Carolina's developments of education standards
and assessments).
62. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (2000)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 5801 (2000)).
63. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425
(2001).
64. See, e.g., Michael Heise, Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and
Legalization of Educational Policy, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1994); James S. Liebman &
Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act and the Post-Desegregation Civil
Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1703 (2003).
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broadening of what the equal educational opportunity doctrine
can mean.
To be sure, gender and the equal educational opportunity doctrine
are far from strangers. Since the 1970s gender has been at the
forefront of those seeking greater educational opportunity for girls
and women. As Salomone makes clear, initial legal assaults were
typically cast in terms of demands for coeducation or, for already
coeducational environments, greater resources for girls and women.
The passage of Title IX and the VM/ decision reflect how gender
equity orientation in education was pursued legally and evidence its
process-based, inputs-oriented conception of equal education.
Once formal access was secured in terms of process and inputs,
new legal theories had to evolve to accomplish more subtle, though
equally important, substantive objectives. Again, the school
desegregation and finance litigation contexts supply helpful
perspective. In the desegregation context, after Milliken v. Bradley65
and in light of enduring racial residential segregation, courts
increasingly turned more broadly to efforts designed to improve
African American student achievement and away from the narrow
perspective of increasing classroom integration.66 Similarly, school
finance litigants witnessed a change from equity to adequacy theory.67
Both contexts evidence an increased willingness to construe equal
educational opportunity from the perspective of outputs, here, in
terms of student academic achievement. Here, the public controversy
surrounding New York City's Young Women's Leadership School in
Harlem neatly captures an emerging perspective oriented around girls'
academic success rather than access to coeducational opportunities.
Thus, Salomone's juxtaposing of these two events (pp. 1-4) captures
the book's themes: the concurrent evolution (and potential collision)
of feminist theory and equal educational opportunity doctrine as well
as these events' consequence.
Although Salomone advocates something quite different from the
traditional perspective of gender equity in the education setting single-sex schooling - she embeds her argument in a similarly
evolving conception of equal educational opportunity grounds. Thus,
decidedly unlike the feminists before her, who struggled for gender
equity in education by ensuring mere access for girls and women to
educational opportunities previously reserved for boys and men,
65. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
66. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (holding that compensatory and
remedial programs can be included as part of a court-ordered desegregation decree)
[hereinafter Milliken II]; James E. Ryan, The Influence ofRace in School Finance Reform, 98
MICH. L. REV. 432, 436-37 & n.18 (1999) (noting the substitution of money for an integrated
educational environment facilitated by Milliken II).
67. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Salomone argues for sex-exclusion rather than inclusion. Decidedly
similar to equal educational opportunists before her, however,
Salomone advances her argument in a deeper conception of the equal
education doctrine. It goes without saying that many will not find
Salomone's argument persuasive, but, even the unpersuaded should
be struck by the dynamicism of the equal educational opportunity
doctrine.
C.

Factors Informing Single-Sex Schooling's Future

Private single-sex schooling will continue to inform the future of
public single-sex schooling. Unlike most other scholarly treatments of
single-sex schooling, Professor Salomone understands that public and
private school markets do not operate in isolation and that both
sectors interact in important ways. Amid all the public and scholarly
mudslinging over education's gender battles, interest in single-sex
schooling continues to grow. Due to the legal uncertainty surrounding
public single-sex schools, private schools have responded to the
increased demand while public schools have balked.68 During a single
school year (1998-99), enrollment in all-girls elementary and
secondary schools rose by 4.4 % (p. 5). During the course of a single
decade, applications to all-girls schools increased by 37%, and
enrollment by 29%. In New York City, with its high concentration of
private schools, application to all-girls schools increased by 69%. All
boys schools enjoyed a similar, though less dramatic, surge, rising by
more than 16% (p. 5). The implication of the recent growth in interest
in single-sex private schools on the public single-sex schooling debate
is indirect, but nonetheless profound. Those with the economic ability
to exit public for private schools exhibit an increasing preference for
single-sex schooling options. Should the ability to act on such a
preference be limited only to those families that can afford private
schools? If not, then why should a similar education option not be
made available to those who attend public schools?
In addition to accommodating individual preferences for single-sex
schooling, problems with public school systems will also inform
debates about single-sex schooling. A growing crisis of confidence
continues to hamstring too many public school districts. In some
districts, particularly those serving minority children from low-income
households, confidence crises gave way long ago to educational
meltdowns.69 Data from the 1989-90 school year in Detroit paint a
distressing yet hauntingly familiar picture. Single mothers raise 70% of

68. Despite legal uncertainty, the number of public single-sex schools (or classroom
experiences) continues to rise as well. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
69. For a fuller discussion see, for example, Ryan & Heise, supra note 44.
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Detroit's public schoolchildren. More than one half of the African
American boys, as compared to 45% of the girls, dropped out of
school. Among those students that persevered to graduation, only
39% were boys. African American boys also accounted for more than
66% of the district's short-term suspensions and 67% of those who
received special services for substance abuse, mental health problems,
or special education services (p. 132). Although the situation in
Detroit might be especially dire, it remains emblematic of many urban
school districts' struggles.70 Thus, whatever one may think about the
merits of the Detroit School Board's proposal to establish all-boy, all
African American schools, it is difficult to challenge the Board's and
public's legitimate sense that an educational disaster has arrived in
Detroit and that drastic steps are both warranted and necessary to
solve the problem. Economic circumstances preclude private school
options of any variety for most families zoned for Detroit's public
schools. For these kids and their families, public schools are their only
alternative. Consequently, the public response to the single-sex (and
single-race) schooling initiative was "overwhelming," as the district
received more than twice the number of applications than they could
accommodate (p. 132).
Present efforts to reform schools and restructure education will
also inform single-sex education. Of particular note is that during the
past few decades the most significant reform efforts in education have
addressed governing structures and institutions and the way
educational services are both generated and delivered.71 Efforts to
reform public schooling now embrace market forces to a degree
unheard of even twenty years ago.72 Specifically, choice - both public
school choice and school voucher programs - has redefined the
educational reform landscape. For any version of school choice to
make sense, options and variations need to exist. Challenges to the
"one best system"73 continue to mount. Thus, Salomone's argument
that single-sex schools contribute to the overall diversity of
educational offerings and enhance school choice parallels a broader
push for reform seeking to diversify the educational system and make

70. For a fuller discussion see Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2103-08.
71. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 44, at 2050-51 (noting the three substantial efforts to
reform education and increase educational opportunity include school desegregation,
finance, and choice).
72. See Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 257, 261-62
(1999) (discussing the explosion of an array of school choice options such as magnet and
charter schools).
73. See generally DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM (1974).
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it more responsive to the heterogeneous needs of the increasingly
heterogeneous population it serves.74
Legislative and research activity will influence single-sex
schooling's progress. The federal government's posture in the
elementary and secondary education setting changed dramatically
with the recent enactments of Goals 2000 and the No Child Left
Behind Act.75 The No Child Left Behind Act contains a provision
targeted toward experimentation in single-sex classes as well as single
sex schools.76 The Bush Administration also expressed its desire for
the Department of Education to construe Title IX in a manner that
would permit local districts more legal latitude in experimenting with
education policies.77 Such legislative initiatives could provide
educational policymakers with much-needed momentum for exploring
single-sex schooling options.
As well, related federal research appropriations could supply
much-needed financial support for research efforts needed, in part, to
generate data upon which a legal defense for single-sex schooling can
partly rest. As previously discussed, part of single-sex schooling's legal
exposure flows from the relative paucity of germane data assessing
single-sex schooling's efficacy.78 Data that exist do not provide
definitive answers. Federal research funding targeted at single-sex
schooling could supplement the research foundation that could, in
tum, inform legal analyses of single-sex schooling.
CONCLUSION

It is with no absence of irony that the fate of boys' education may
shape the future of single-sex schooling generally and, therefore,
influence the fate of all-girls' schools. Although the clear thrust of the
modem single-sex schooling movement dwells on girls and all-girls
schools, Salomone notes a growing concern with the challenges boys
confront in school. Part of the increased attention to boys' educational
needs is due to boys' unique circumstances. Another part of the story
is comparative. Specifically, emerging data now suggest that girls and

74. Professor Salomone notes (and implicitly supports) the Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights' recent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment upon the
policy question considering whether single-sex schooling can encourage local innovation,
expand parental (school) choice, increase educational diversity, and promote equal
educational opportunity (p. 175).
75. See supra Part III.A.
76. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1001, 115 Stat. 1425
(2001).
77. See Diana J. Schemo, White House Proposes New View of Education Law to
Encourage Single-Sex Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at A26.
78. See supra Part II.A.
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women are beginning to outperform boys and men in academic areas
where males held a long advantage.79 Of course, one explanation for
this trend is that rather than a decrease in male academic
performance, females are only now just beginning to recover from
generations of education discrimination. Regardless of the
explanation, these data help focus attention on males' education needs
and on whether single-sex schooling might be able to assist.
The possibility that boys' educational fates might drive the legal
and policy efficacy of all-girls schools risks playing into some
feminists' deepest fears: that girls' interest in single-sex education can
become a policy reality only after it becomes clear that single-sex
schooling advances boys' interests as well.80 On the other hand,
perhaps it is of some consolation that feminists supporting all-girls
schools can cast their interest across genders and leverage interest in
all-boys schools to their benefit. Whether such a result ameliorates or,
paradoxically, deepens the gender paradox remains unclear. Such a
bittersweet pill for feminists principally concerned with the
educational fate of girls and women and the possibility that their
educations continue to be shortchanged in traditional coeducation
settings might be a necessary cost along the way. But if the political
cost of securing legal protection for all-girls schooling is the
simultaneous creation of all-boys schools, given that the realization of
our children's full academic potential is at stake, the cost is probably
worthwhile.

79. Two recent developments illustrate. First, in many industrialized nations, women are
beginning to graduate from post-secondary institutions in numbers that exceed men. See
Alaina S. Potrikus, Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau, Report Shows Academic
Achievement Gap Between Girls, Boys (Sept. 19, 2003), at http://www.thatsracin.com/mld/
krwashington/news/nation/6814183.htm. At the post-graduate level, for the first time in
history women applicants to American medical schools exceeded male applicants. See More
Women Aspiring to be Doctors (Dec. 8, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/EDUCATION/
1 2/08/medical.school.ap/index.html.
80. As previously discussed, the empirical evidence of potential benefits flowing from
single-sex schooling is murky at best. However, Salomone is careful to note that the weight
of existing evidence provides some basic support for three general propositions. First, single
sex schooling does not appear to harm students. Second, on balance, girls more than boys
appear to benefit from single-sex schooling. Third, benefits to boys from single-sex schooling
are more likely for boys from minority and low-income households (p. 235).

